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The overall, UK-wide result was: 51.9% ‘leave’ 
against 48.1% ‘remain’. Turnout was 71.8% with 
17.4 million voters voting ‘leave’ and 16.1 million 
voters voting ‘remain’. 
In England and Wales the majority of voters 
voted ‘leave’. In Northern Ireland, as in Scotland 
and Gibraltar, however, a majority of voters 
indicated a desire to remain in the EU. In 
Scotland, all the counts returned majorities in 
favour of remain (see map).
On a turnout of 62.7%, a total of 440,707 voters 
in Northern Ireland opted to remain in the EU; 
349,442 voters in Northern Ireland opted to 
leave the EU. 
¹ This briefing paper was prepared by Prof. David Phinnemore and Dr. Lee McGowan, both at Queen’s 
University Belfast (QUB). Section 3 draws extensively on the EUDebateNI briefing paper entitled To Remain 
or Leave? Northern Ireland and the EU Referendum produced in November 2015 by a team of academics 
comprising Prof. David Phinnemore (editor), Dr. Lee McGowan, Prof. Yvonne Galligan (QUB), Dr. Cathal 
McCall (QUB) and Dr. Mary Murphy (University College Cork).
Remain Leave Turnout
Total % Total % %
England 13,247,674 46.6 15,187,583 53.4 73.0
Northern Ireland 440,707 55.8 349,442 44.2 62.7
Scotland 1,661,191 62.0 1,018,322 38.0 67.2
Wales 772,347 47.5 854,572 52.5 71.7
Gibraltar 19,322 95.9 823 4.1 83.5
Total 16,141,241 48.1 17,410,742 51.9 72.2
Source: Electoral Commission (2016)
The Referendum Result
On 23 June 2016 the UK government held a referendum asking the question: ‘Should the United 
Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’
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The EU Referendum Result in the UK
Source: 
BBC News at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36616028
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Triggering Article 50 
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With the result declared, the UK government 
was left with the decision of whether and when 
to formally notify the European Council under 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) of its intention to withdraw the UK from 
the EU. 
No immediate decision was taken. Instead, 
the Prime Minister, David Cameron resigned, 
leaving the decision to his successor, Teresa 
May. On taking office on 13 July, May declared 
that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ signalling an intention 
to negotiate the terms of withdrawal. To this 
end a new Ministerial post of ‘Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union’ was 
created with David Davis, a leading ‘leave’ 
supporter – a so-called ‘Brexiteer’ – being 
appointed. The establishment of a Department 
for Exiting the European Union duly followed. 
Other ‘Brexiteers’ were given leading roles 
in the new government. Boris Johnson, co-
leader of the ‘leave’ campaign was appointed 
Foreign Secretary, and Liam Fox, was given the 
newly created post of Secretary of State for 
International Trade. 
However, as of August 2016, the UK government 
had still not notified the European Council 
under Article 50 of its intention to withdraw 
the UK from the EU. The expectation is that 
Article 50 will not be triggered until 2017 at the 
earliest.
The absence of formal notification is significant. 
Without it, negotiations on withdrawal from the 
EU cannot formally begin. This is the clear view 
of the UK’s partners in the EU. At a meeting 
of the leaders of the other 27 member states 
on 29 June 2016 (see Box), so during the week 
after the referendum, they made their position 
clear: ‘There can be no negotiations of any kind 
before this notification has taken place’. 
Informal Meeting of EU(27) Heads of Government and State
Brussels, 29 June 2016
Statement
1. We, the Heads of State or Government of 27 Member States, as well as the 
Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, deeply 
regret the outcome of the referendum in the UK but we respect the will 
expressed by a majority of the British people. Until the UK leaves the EU, EU 
law continues to apply to and within the UK, both when it comes to rights 
and obligations. 
2. There is a need to organise the withdrawal of the UK from the EU in an 
orderly fashion. Article 50 TEU provides the legal basis for this process. It 
is up to the British government to notify the European Council of the UK’s 
intention to withdraw from the Union. This should be done as quickly as 
possible. There can be no negotiations of any kind before this notification 
has taken place. 
3. Once the notification has been received, the European Council will adopt 
guidelines for the negotiations of an agreement with the UK. In the further 
process the European Commission and the European Parliament will play 
their full role in accordance with the Treaties.
Where are we and what might happen next?
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There are three main reasons for the delay in 
the UK government triggering Article 50 and 
therefore negotiations on withdrawal. The 
first is a lack of clarity of whether the Prime 
Minister has the power to take the decision 
to notify the European Council of the UK 
government’s intention to withdraw the UK 
from the EU or whether there needs to be a 
vote in Parliament authorizing the notification. 
There are currently a range of private legal 
actions arguing that only Parliament has the 
authority to invoke Article 50. At the opening 
of the first of these legal challenges on 18 
July, government lawyers conceded that any 
judgement was likely to be appealed up to 
the Supreme Court, and that consequently 
the Prime Minister is not expected to trigger 
Article 50 before the end of 2016 and more 
likely in early 2017. Legal challenges were also 
either threatened or lodged with the High 
Court in Belfast (see Box).
The second reason is that the UK government 
needs time to determine its priorities for 
the withdrawal negotiations and its strategy 
for negotiating withdrawal. It also needs to 
decide what its priorities are for the separate 
but clearly related negotiations on the terms 
of a new relationship with the EU. What was 
evident in the aftermath of the referendum 
was that neither the UK government nor the 
Leave campaign had a clear and detailed 
plan for what should happen in the event 
of a ‘leave’ vote and what the strategy for 
negotiations should be.
Third, there is also a need to establish what 
the UK-wide position is, or at least a position 
that takes into consideration the different 
interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Theresa May has indicated that she 
wants to agree a ‘UK approach’ before Article 
50 is triggered. Agreement will not be easily 
achieved given the very strong regional 
interests that have been expressed not 
least by the Scottish Government. The clear 
preference, as the Scottish First Minister, 
Nicola Sturgeon, has been quick to state, is 
for Scotland to remain in the EU. The First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern 
Ireland have also been flagging key issues ‘of 
particular significance’ to Theresa May (see 
below). Reaching internal UK agreement is 
important; without agreement the integrity 
of the UK could be threatened, particularly 
with the question of a further referendum 
on Scottish independence once again on the 
political agenda. 
Challenging Brexit in Northern Ireland
Solicitors for a cross-community group including politicians and human rights 
activists threatened in July to take a judicial review before the High Court in 
Belfast unless the UK government addresses a range of obligations before 
triggering Article 50. The group argued that the consent of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly is required. It also argued that the UK government is 
obliged as part of Brexit to safeguard ‘the unique requirements of Northern 
Ireland constitutional law and statute, in particular the statutory recognition 
of the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement and [satisfy] the requirements of EU 
law incorporated into the law of Northern Ireland”.
Sources: The Detail, 25 July 2016; BBC News, 11 August 2016 
Where are we and what might happen next?
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Withdrawal Negotiations
Once Article 50 is triggered – and the 
expectation is that it will be triggered – the 
process of negotiating the terms of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU will begin. Article 
50 provides for a two year period for the 
negotiations (see Box). It also sets out the 
process.
First, the leaders of the other 27 EU member 
states will, meeting as the European Council 
but without the UK Prime Minister taking part 
in their deliberations, adopt guidelines for the 
negotiations.
Second, negotiations on the terms of 
withdrawal will take place between the EU and 
the UK government. For those negotiations to 
be concluded, they require the agreement of 
the UK and at least 20 of the remaining 27 EU 
member states. The list of 20 member states 
needs to include most of the larger member 
states. The 20 member states must represent 
65% of the population of the EU minus the UK. 
Third, the conclusion of the withdrawal 
agreement needs the consent of the European 
Parliament. In order to provide that consent a 
simple majority of MEPs present at the vote 
is required provided that one third (251) of 
the total number of MEPs (751) vote. If there 
is no majority or not enough MEPs vote, the 
withdrawal agreement cannot be concluded.
Fourth, the withdrawal agreement will need 
to be approved by the UK ‘in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements’. It is 
assumed that this will require a positive vote 
in Parliament. What is unclear is whether it will 
also require a positive vote in the devolved 
assemblies. Parliament could also decide to put 
the terms of the withdrawal agreement to the 
UK electorate in a second referendum. 
All this is expected to take place within two 
years from the notification of the intention to 
withdraw. It is possible if there is no agreement 
for the two year period to be extended. Such an 
extension requires the unanimous agreement 
of the UK and the remaining 27 EU member 
states; any member state can therefore veto 
an extension. If there is no decision to extend 
the two year period, the UK will cease to be a 
member of the EU after the two years.
Article 50 TEU
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council 
of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, 
the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting 
out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for 
its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in 
accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by 
a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of 
entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after 
the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend 
this period. 
Where are we and what might happen next?
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4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European 
Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall 
not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in 
decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall 
be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
In addition to negotiating its withdrawal from 
the EU once Article 50 is triggered, the UK and 
the EU will want to negotiate a new post-Brexit 
relationship. Formally, that relationship cannot 
be negotiated until the UK has left the EU, 
although it is expected that informal negotiations 
at least will run in parallel to the negotiations 
on the terms of withdrawal. Either way, these 
negotiations on the new UK-EU relationship are 
likely to last much longer than the two years 
set aside for the withdrawal negotiations. Much 
depends on what sort of relationship the UK 
will be seeking (see below) and how tough the 
negotiations will be. 
Statements from EU leaders have already 
indicated that the EU will not allow the UK to 
‘cherry-pick’ what it wants from the EU. If the UK 
wants access to the single market, for example, 
it will have to accept each of the ‘four freedoms’: 
the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and – importantly – people. The ‘leave’ 
campaign’s focus on controlling immigration at 
least suggests that the free movement of people 
is not something that the UK government will be 
willing to accept.
Assuming agreement is reached on a new 
relationship it is likely to require the unanimous 
approval of the remaining 27 EU member states. 
It will also require ratification in the UK and in 
each of the EU member states and the consent 
of the European Parliament. This will take a 
number of years since it will involve votes in each 
chamber of each national parliament as well as 
some regional parliaments. It might also involve 
a referendum in one or more EU member state. 
It is for each member state to determine how it 
ratifies the agreement. It could also conceivably 
involve a referendum in the UK.
Negotiating the new UK-EU Relationship
Where are we and what might happen next?
In addition to negotiating the terms of 
withdrawal and the new relationship with the 
EU, the UK will also need to negotiate trade 
agreements with those 53 partners with which 
it currently has preferential market access 
arrangements through EU trade and other 
agreements but which it will lose on leaving 
the EU. Current partners include: Switzerland, 
Norway, Ukraine, Russia, Singapore, Israel, 
Vietnam, South Korea and Mexico. Being 
outside the EU – and assuming the new UK-
EU relationship does not involve the UK being 
part of the EU’s customs union – the UK will be 
free to negotiate trade agreements with other 
partners as well. These include US, China, India, 
Australia and New Zealand with which the EU is 
yet to conclude free trade agreements. Before 
all this there will have to be negotiations on 
updating the UK’s membership of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) to reflect the fact it 
will have left the EU.
Other negotiations will be internal to the UK and 
cover arrangements for what happens to powers 
repatriated from the EU. Key questions arising 
from the devolution settlements will be what 
powers need to be and should be devolved? 
There will also need to be negotiations on what 
central finances follow to administer and fund 
these new policy competences and policies to 
replace those of the EU. Obviously important 
areas include agricultural policy.
Other Negotiations
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Each set of negotiations is important for 
Northern Ireland. The terms of withdrawal – the 
divorce settlement - will govern issues such as 
budget payments, arrangements for current 
involvement in EU programmes (e.g. research 
projects) and the rights of UK citizens in the 
EU and vice versa. The negotiation on the new 
UK-EU relationship will be the key negotiation 
since it will determine among other things: 
what access Northern Ireland producers will 
have to the EU – and importantly the Republic 
of Ireland – market; whether there will continue 
to be free movement of workers across the 
border; whether it will be possible to offer 
services across the border; what involvement 
there will be – if any – in EU programmes; what 
EU standards will need to be met in order to 
trade with EU partners. 
The trade negotiations with third countries and 
regional trade organizations will determine 
what access Northern Ireland producers will 
have to their markets and importantly what 
access will be granted to the UK market, e.g. for 
agricultural goods. The internal negotiations 
will affect devolved policy responsibilities and 
raise questions about what policies would best 
suit Northern Ireland.
In this context it is important that the Northern 
Ireland interest can be defined and articulated. 
Formal responsibility lies with the Northern 
Ireland (NI) Executive. Following the May 2016 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
the NI Executive comprises MLAs from the 
Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein (SF) 
and one Independent. It is led by the First 
Minister, Arlene Foster (DUP) and the Deputy 
First Minister, Martin McGuinness (SF). The NI 
Executive enjoys the support of 67 MLAs (see 
Table). Significantly the NI Executive does 
not, as it has in the past, include MLAs from 
the Alliance Party, the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) and the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP). The three parties’ 36 MLAs form 
the de facto opposition along with five other 
MLAs in the NI Assembly. 
The role for Northern Ireland in 
forthcoming negotiations 
Party Seats First Preferences
Seats Votes Share
Democratic Unionist Party 38 - 202,567 29.2% 
Sinn Féin 28 -1 166,785 24.0% 
Ulster Unionist Party 16 - 87,302 12.6% 
SDLP 12 -2 83,364 12.0% 
Alliance Party 8 - 48,447 7.0% 
Green Party 2 +1 18,718 2.7% 
People before Profit 2 +2 13,761 2.0% 
Traditional Unionist Voice 1 - 23,776 3.4% 
Independents 1 - 22,650 3.3% 
UKIP 0 - 10,109 1.5% 
Source: www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results
Where are we and what might happen next?
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The NI Executive faces two immediate 
challenges: firstly, identifying options and 
agreeing a NI position on what ‘Brexit means’ 
and secondly, ensuring that it can have its 
opinions voiced by the UK government. It is 
positive to note that Theresa May, echoing her 
immediate predecessor David Cameron, has 
insisted that she wants to hear the views of the 
devolved administration in negotiations. It is a 
sensible option but requires preparedness and 
engagement from the devolved administrations. 
Identifying and establishing positions and 
then voicing them and having them heard are 
different and challenging things to achieve. 
And the challenges are particularly great in 
Northern Ireland.
This is because the question of ‘Brexit’ divides 
the NI Executive. The DUP campaigned for a 
‘leave’ vote with the First Minister, Arlene Foster, 
welcoming the outcome UK-wide by stating: 
‘I think this is a good result for the United 
Kingdom. Our nation is safe.’ (BBC Radio Ulster, 
24 June 2016). Martin McGuinness, whose Sinn 
Fein campaigned for a ‘remain’ vote, responded 
by saying that ‘we now have a situation where 
Brexit has become a further cost of partition, 
a further cost of the Union and Sinn Fein will 
now press our demand, our long standing 
demand, for a border poll’ (Belfast Telegraph, 24 
June 2016). Compounding these fundamental 
differences is the fact that the NI Executive 
failed to commission any scenario planning for 
the event that there was a ‘leave’ vote and so 
was manifestly unprepared for the outcome. 
The same can be said for the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. Neither had contributed in any 
meaningful manner to David Cameron’s efforts 
to renegotiate the terms of UK membership prior 
to the referendum or to consider the implications 
of ‘Brexit’ for Northern Ireland. Only one 
substantial report on the economic implications 
of ‘Brexit’ was commissioned. Produced by 
Oxford Economics, it concluded that Northern 
Ireland was likely to be more vulnerable to any 
negative economic consequences from Brexit 
than the rest of the UK.
Since the referendum, efforts have been made 
to begin to define the interests of Northern 
Ireland’s voters, workers, producers, consumers 
etc. This has led to a number of key challenges 
being identified and an initial statement issued 
to the UK government. In August 2016 the First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister wrote to 
Theresa May outlined a number of key concerns, 
namely: the implications of Brexit for the border 
and especially for the agri-food industry, the 
need to ensure business competitiveness 
through ease of access to trade and labour 
markets, energy supply, structural funding and 
funding for the peace process. The concerns 
were presented as ‘initial thoughts’ only.
The letter followed a visit to Belfast by Theresa 
May during which she provided an assurance 
that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
would be fully involved and represented in the 
negotiations on the UK’s future relationships 
with the EU and other countries. The letter 
also highlighted a desire to have full access 
to discussions between the UK and Irish 
governments. 
The actual mechanics of how Northern Ireland 
can and will develop a clear sense of what its 
interests are in the different sets of negotiations 
and how it will be able to get them voiced remain 
unclear. Mechanisms are required. A number 
already exist, such as internal discussions within 
the NI Executive, NI Assembly debates and 
Assembly Committee hearings and inquiries. 
There are also formal if often rather opaque 
mechanisms for representing interests to the 
UK government and sharing perspectives with 
the other devolved regions (Joint Ministerial 
Committee) and with the Irish government 
(North-South Ministerial Council). 
Then there is the opportunity – indeed need 
– to widen the range of mechanisms to draw 
in more interested parties likely to be affected 
by Brexit so views can be heard beyond official 
government positions. A number of parties are 
already making their views known. For example, 
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representatives from Northern Ireland business 
organizations have issued a joint statement 
‘Moving on from Brexit’ echoing the concerns 
raised by the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister and calling for access to the single 
market to be maintained.
How to involve these and other voices in 
developing the Northern Ireland position 
demands some creative thinking on who should 
be involved, when and how, and whether the 
fora – and which – might and should be limited 
to Northern Ireland, engage the other devolved 
regions and involve a cross-border dimension. 
There is also the question of how else to best 
promote the interests of Northern Ireland so 
that they are reflected in the different sets of 
negotiations. 
A further consideration is what role Northern 
Ireland should have in deciding whether and 
which negotiating outcome should be approved. 
Some voices have suggested that the devolved 
governments and assemblies should have a 
veto over the triggering of Article 50; a larger 
number have made the case for them having 
to be formally consulted on and being granted 
a veto over the final terms of withdrawal and 
potentially the new relationship with the 
EU. This follows from the fact that Brexit will 
affect the scope and terms of devolution. In 
such circumstances, the convention is that 
the changes demand consultation with and 
the consent of the devolved legislatures. The 
principles of consultation and consent need to 
be upheld so that Northern Ireland can ensure 
its voice is heard. There is also the point that in 
the case of Scotland and Northern Ireland the 
electorates voted ‘remain’ in the referendum. 
Is it legitimate for the Scotland and Northern 
Ireland to be taken out of the EU against the 
wishes of and on terms not expressly supported 
by the majority of those who voted in the 
referendum? 
Some voices certainly believe the answer is 
no. Among them are those who see in Brexit a 
process that could undermine the Good Friday 
Agreement and its outworkings. For such 
voices there would then be good grounds for a 
border poll. Indeed calls from both parts of the 
island of Ireland for a poll on Irish unification 
intensified immediately after the EU referendum 
on 23 June. The calls were though swiftly 
rejected by the Secretary of State and others 
on the grounds that there is little support for 
change to the current constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland. Depending on how the Brexit 
process is handled and what the impacts are 
that could change.
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Options 1: The Status Quo
Options 2: Partial Brexit 
Options 3: Existing Options for Outside the EU 
Options 4: A Bespoke Arrangement for Outside the EU
Options 5: No Agreement
What are the 
potential options
for Northern 
Ireland?
Fot. Lyn Gateley
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The UK and 
Northern Ireland in 
Brexit: Options
The absence of any UK government or ‘leave’ 
campaign plans for withdrawal or the new UK-
EU relationship to replace EU membership 
means there is considerable uncertainty about 
what shape future UK-EU relations should and 
will take. That uncertainty is compounded by 
the fact that many supporters of ‘remain’ in 
those parts of the UK – i.e. Northern Ireland 
and Scotland – that did not return majorities 
in favour of ‘leave’ wish to see their votes 
respected just as much as the ‘leave’ majorities 
in England and Wales. The same applies to 
Gibraltar where citizens have the right to move 
freely to Spain and establish businesses there. 
The uncertainty means that there is scope 
– arguably a need – to consider a range of 
options. Most are relationships that the EU 
has already established with one or more non-
member states, or a variant of them. Others 
are more bespoke; and in some instances the 
options respond specifically to the situation 
created by the referendum: a member state 
that overall has voted to ‘leave’ the EU but one 
that comprises a number of constituent parts 
split on whether they wish to remain in or leave 
the EU. 
Among them are also arrangements based on 
a form of continued membership of the EU. 
That Article 50 may not be triggered or the 
UK may ultimately decide not to leave the EU 
cannot be ruled entirely. Officially, according 
to Theresa May, ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and the 
prevailing public and political view is that with 
the referendum result the UK has embarked 
on a process that will see it leave the EU. 
The recently appointed Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, James Brokenshire, has 
certainly stated that it is hard for him to see 
Northern Ireland staying in the EU after the 
vote for Brexit. That said, forms of continued 
membership merit attention. 
All options need to be considered bearing 
in mind the key challenges Brexit poses for 
Northern Ireland. Two specific challenges are 
flagged here; there are many others, for example 
those discussed in the previous section.
The first centres on the nature and shape of 
the border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland in a post-Brexit world; 
will this continue to be an increasingly soft 
border or will it as the external border of the 
EU become increasingly hardened with the UK 
having opted out of the EU’s customs union 
and with a London government implementing 
strict immigration controls into the UK? 
The second concerns the future status of the 
Common Travel Area (CTA) between Ireland 
and the UK: can and will the freedoms enjoyed 
as part of the CTA arranges be sustained 
post-Brexit; and if so, how? On her first visit 
to Northern Ireland as Prime Minister, Theresa 
May declared that maintaining ‘peace and 
stability will always be of the ‘highest priority 
for my government’ and that there would be no 
return of border checks for people entering the 
UK from the Republic of Ireland (The Guardian, 
25 July 2016). The issue of the CTA had also the 
previous week been identified as a ‘priority’ by 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 
the House of Commons on 20 July 2016. How 
this can be achieved remains far from clear.
The range of options notionally open to 
the UK for a new relationship with the EU is 
considerable. A key question is how realistically 
achievable each is given the negotiating 
position of the EU and the capacity of the UK 
to negotiate successfully. The same applies to 
Northern Ireland. What is achievable depends 
very much on its capacity to pursue a particular 
outcome and the receptiveness of the UK 
government and the EU to accommodate 
its preferences. The options presented here 
each have their attractions and drawbacks. 
Assessing how realistically achievable each is is 
beyond the scope of this paper, although some 
general comments are provided. The list should 
not be viewed as exhaustive; other options 
exist and other ideas will emerge. Nor should 
any preference be inferred on the part of the 
authors.
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Options for Northern Ireland
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Options 1: The Status Quo
A first option is the status quo. If Article 50 is 
not triggered then the status quo will prevail. 
If so, the UK would continue as a member of 
the EU. In doing so, it would retain its special 
status with assorted opt-outs, but would not, 
unless it can secure the renewed agreement of 
the other member states, benefit from the ‘new 
settlement’ deal that Cameron secured from 
the European Council in February 2016.
The status quo would see the UK continue to 
participate fully in the EU customs union and the 
single market and by extension the European 
Economic Area (see below). It would, however, 
be outside the eurozone and the fiscal compact 
treaty and keep its opt-out from joining the 
euro (see Figure). It would also be outside 
the Schengen area and benefit from opt-out/
opt-in arrangements around police and judicial 
cooperation and aspects of the EU’s area of 
freedom, security and justice. Significantly, 
the UK would retain existing involvement in 
decision-making bodies and process. No form 
of relationship other than membership provides 
for such involvement.
Europe, the European Union and the United Kingdom in 2016
Source: HM Treasury, 2016
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Options 2: Partial Brexit 
A second set of options are based on what 
would be a partial Brexit. In other words, 
they see the UK remaining in the EU yet with 
those parts of the UK that voted to ‘leave’ 
moving outside key areas of EU integration 
and cooperation. For their advocates, these 
options allow the ‘remain’ votes in the other 
parts of the UK to be respected and so for 
Scotland and Northern Ireland to maintain as 
far as possible existing levels of integration 
with the rest of the EU. 
A first option is the Reverse Greenland option. 
This draws its inspiration from the departure 
of Greenland, which is part of Denmark, from 
the then European Communities in 1985.2 
The idea of a ‘reverse Greenland’ envisages 
the UK remaining in the EU, but not all of 
its constituent parts doing so. The ‘Reverse 
Greenland’ model could see Northern Ireland 
(alongside Gibraltar and Scotland) opting 
to stay in the EU while England and Wales 
leave. The model is the Kingdom of Denmark 
which comprises three territories, namely 
Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. 
When Denmark acceded to the EEC in 1973, 
Greenlanders accepted the overall Danish 
decision to join despite having voted against 
the idea in a pre-accession referendum. 
Following the granting of greater autonomy 
to Greenland in 1979, the island’s government 
took the decision to withdraw from the EEC. 
As part of the post-withdrawal arrangements, 
Greenland maintains some links with the EU 
through Denmark but is not subject to EU 
rules (except on trade). The effect is that 
part of the Kingdom of Denmark’s territory 
is therefore exempted from the obligations of 
EU membership. 
The Reverse Greenland option would see 
the UK remain an EU member state, yet with 
England and Wales – and so the bulk of the 
population – exempted from the obligations 
of membership. The rest of the UK – Scotland 
and Northern Ireland (plus Gibraltar) – would 
remain in the EU, albeit with reduced voting 
powers and fewer MEPs. The exact status of 
England and Wales in terms of market access, 
involvement in the single market etc., would 
have to be negotiated. 
A second option is contained in The 
Dalriada Document and has been developed 
specifically to address the different votes in 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
in what was formally an advisory referendum 
on 23 June 2016. The option envisages the 
bulk of the UK moving outside the EU and 
some parts remaining within the EU. The 
option is predicated on the fact that the UK 
comprises two existing unions, that of Great 
Britain and that of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. In each of these unions one partner 
has expressed their desire to remain in the 
EU. It envisages a situation where England 
and Wales secede from, but Northern Ireland 
and Scotland remain in the EU. This would, 
as the document notes, have some significant 
implications, not least a hard customs border 
in the Irish Sea and between England and 
Scotland. However, it would respect the votes 
in the different parts of the UK; it would also 
keep the UK intact.3
2 Greenland was not the first part of the EU to leave European Communities. Algeria left in 1962 on gaining its 
independence from France. 
3 Unlike some other suggestions, such as the idea a ‘three-union state of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland 
(SCINI)’.
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As the debate prior to and especially since 
the referendum has demonstrated, there are 
a variety of forms of relationship that have 
been established by the EU with non-member 
states. Each of these could provide a model 
for a new post-withdrawal UK-EU relationship. 
Each involves different levels of integration and 
a different set of rights and obligations. That 
there is a balance of rights and obligations is 
important to note. It is a reflection of the well-
established fact that the EU does not allow non-
member states to cherry-pick those aspects of 
integration that they wish to have as part of any 
formal relationship. 
That said, from a Northern Ireland perspective, 
it is worth noting that in developing its external 
relations, the EU has included in a number of 
relationships special arrangements for particular 
regions, or at least the option to pursue special 
relationships. This is the case regarding Svalbard 
– part of Norway – in relation to the application 
of the EEA Agreement. Beyond the options 
given below, there are special arrangements for 
Kaliningrad in the EU’s relations with Russia. So 
precedents exist for bespoke arrangements for 
specific regions.
The most developed form of relationship the EU 
has with non-member states in is the European 
Economic Area (EEA). This governs the EU’s 
relations with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
Indeed, it is sometimes referred to as the ‘Norway 
Option’. Originally, when first established, the 
EEA also involved Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
but they soon joined the EU. Essentially the 
EEA extends the EU’s single market comprising 
the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and people to the non-member states. Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway therefore implement 
EU regulations and directives governing these 
four freedoms. Although the EEA does not 
involve participation in the EU’s Common 
External Tariff, the Common Commercial Policy, 
the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common 
Fisheries Policy, or the Eurozone, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway do also implement 
regulations and directives in a range of so-
called ‘flanking policies’ designed to assist the 
smooth functioning of the single market. These 
policies cover, for example, the environment, 
competition, consumer protection, safety 
standards, and public procurement. Important to 
note is that EEA participants are obliged not only 
to adopt existing EU regulations and directives, 
but also future ones relevant to the functioning 
of the EEA. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
also participate in various EU programmes 
(e.g. Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020) and make 
significant financial contributions to them and 
in support of reducing social and economic 
disparities in the EU. None of these states, 
however, has a say on the adoption of new EU 
legislation. They have no representation in the 
EU’s decision-making institutions or processes. 
At best they are consulted on Commission 
proposals for legislation. Moreover, failure to 
adopt relevant new EU legislation can lead to 
suspension of the EEA. Legislation is expected 
to be interpreted in line with the jurisprudence 
of the EU’s Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
The attraction of the EEA is full access to the 
single market.4 Free movement of goods is 
subject, however, to some controls flowing 
from the fact that the EEA does not involve EU 
non-member states in the EU’s customs union. 
Trade is therefore subject to customs controls 
4 Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway also participate in Schengen. However, this is not an obligation of participation 
in the EEA and is decided and regulated separately. If the UK were to join the EEA it would not be obliged to join 
Schengen. 
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and businesses are expected to be able to prove 
the origin of their goods. The same applies 
for agricultural goods given these are not 
automatically covered by the principle of free 
movement. If the UK opted for the EEA, there 
would need to be some form of customs controls 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. There would also be financial costs to 
the UK. To join the EEA as currently constituted, 
the UK would need the agreement of all EU 
member states; it would also have to re-join 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a 
process that would require the agreement of its 
existing members: the three EEA participants 
as well as Switzerland which has not joined the 
EEA. 
Instead Switzerland has its own set of bilateral 
agreements with the EU. These constitute the 
so-called Swiss Option and cover a range of 
issues designed to secure Switzerland access 
to the EU single market. Access covers most 
trade in goods but some agricultural goods 
remain outside the scope of the agreements and 
Switzerland has more limited access to trade in 
services than EEA participants. It does not have 
full access to the single market for its banking 
sector, for example; the same is true of other 
parts of the services sector including insurance. 
Switzerland does not have any access to the EU 
market in financial services. 
Like Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, 
Switzerland contributes financially so that it can 
participate in the EU’s research and education 
programmes. As with the EEA, Switzerland 
has no involvement in the EU’s institutions or 
decision-making processes. Unlike the EEA, 
however, it has no right of consultation. It also 
sits outside the EU customs union so customs 
controls still must be applied. However, unlike 
its fellow EFTA member states, it is not obliged 
to adopt new EU legislation regarding the 
single market but is expected to ensure that its 
domestic legislation is aligned with the relevant 
EU regulations and directives. Examples include 
competition policy and environmental policy. 
Failure to comply can lead the EU to block 
Switzerland’s access to the single market. Indeed 
a number of Switzerland’s bilateral agreements 
with the EU are linked through a so-called 
guillotine clause meaning that failure to meet in 
full obligations under one agreement can lead 
to the suspension of rights under the others. 
This has been threatened following the Swiss 
referendum in February 2014 on introducing 
immigration quotas including on EU nationals. 
This clearly contravenes the provisions in the 
agreement on the free movement of persons. 
The linked agreements include those covering 
agriculture, research and civil aviation.
The third option is the Turkey Option. Where this 
differs from the EEA and the Swiss options most 
clearly is in Turkey’s participation in the EU’s 
customs union. This means that in exchange for 
tariff- and quota-free access to the EU market 
for industrial goods, Turkey not only provides 
the same access to its own market for EU goods, 
it also applies the EU’s external tariff on its trade 
third countries. 
While the custom union option may bring 
market access it does not mean that Turkey has 
full access to the single market. For example, 
agricultural goods and services do not form part 
of the customs union. Turkey also has no say on 
the tariffs it has to impose on goods it imports 
from non-EU countries, as it has to apply the 
EU’s common external tariff to those goods 
(and is not involved in setting it). This acts as a 
significant constraint on the development of its 
own trade agreements with other partners and a 
key reason why there have been calls for the UK 
not to consider a customs union option. Also, 
Turkey is expected to adopt EU rules in relation 
to competition policy and environmental policy 
and align with EU state aid rules. The existing 
agreement between the EU and Turkey allows for 
limited migration to the EU for Turkish nationals, 
but not free movement. Even visa-free travel for 
Turkish citizens has still to be conceded. Turkey 
does not make any contributions to the EU 
budget; it has no say in EU decision-making.
From a Northern Ireland perspective, a key 
attraction of a customs union option is that 
would limit the need to impose customs controls. 
Options for Northern Ireland
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However, unless accompanied by the free 
movement of people, border controls of some 
form would be needed to ensure immigration 
into the UK could be controlled. 
A fourth option is the Canada Option and the 
recently negotiated – but still to enter in to 
force – Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA). It is one of the EU’s most 
comprehensive and ambitious trade deals ever 
agreed with a third party. If approved, CETA will 
eliminate 98% of tariffs between Canada and 
the EU. The agreement also removes restrictions 
on access to public contracts and opens up the 
services market in areas such as postal services 
and maritime transport. The agreement ensures 
EU standards in areas such as food safety and 
worker’s rights are upheld and provides for 
guarantees that economic benefits do not come 
at the expense of the environment or consumers’ 
health and safety. Canada is neither required to 
contribute to the EU budget nor expected to 
sign up to the EU rules on the free movement of 
people. There are, however, some limitations and 
exceptions to the CETA agreement: tariffs and 
quotas will remain in place for some agricultural 
products; trade in services is only partially 
liberalised; and there are a considerable number 
of ‘reservations’ within the deal. Canada’s ability 
to take advantage of the EU financial services 
passport is dependent on Ottawa establishing 
a presence in the EU and respecting EU rules in 
this area.
The attraction of a CETA-type option is market 
access. However, there are restrictions on 
the scope of free trade, notably as regards 
agricultural goods; and customs and immigration 
controls would have to be imposed.
Options for Northern Ireland
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Existing discussions of the above options have 
often, particularly in regard to the EEA, involved 
ideas for more and less advanced variants 
of them. It has, for example, been suggested 
that the UK join the EEA as an interim option 
so as to provide more time to negotiate a 
post-withdrawal relationship with the EU, and 
potentially something more bespoke for the 
UK.
Such a bespoke arrangement could combine 
different elements of the above arrangements 
or entail something significantly different. The 
political preferences of ‘leave’ campaigners 
certainly point to the desirability of something 
bespoke. While access to the single market 
for goods, capital and services is desired, 
there is no apparent wish to maintain the free 
movement of persons or workers. Consequently 
there is opposition to the EEA option. And this 
is before consideration is given to the lack of 
any decision-making role.
Whether a bespoke arrangement that deviates 
significantly from any of the options above can 
be established for the UK, has to be questioned. 
EU leaders have been quick to warn that there 
can be no ‘cherry-picking’ which aspects of 
market access and integration a non-member 
state can have in a relationship with the EU. 
The line has been particularly strongly stated 
with regard to opting out of the free movement 
of workers but otherwise being involved in the 
single market via the EEA. The warnings should 
be heeded. No existing relationship has involved 
the sort of ‘pick and mix’ approach that some 
‘leave’ campaigners and commentators believe 
can be pursued. It should be noted as well that 
any concessions which the EU might make to 
the UK will have to be ones that it will be willing 
to offer to others. This is expected to mean 
further constraints on what the EU is willing to 
offer the UK
A bespoke arrangement for the UK clearly 
has its challenges. So too does achieving a 
bespoke arrangement for Northern Ireland 
within whatever relationship the UK manages 
to establish with the EU, assuming that this is 
what might be sought. That said, special status 
arrangements for particular geographical 
regions or entities are not unknown either 
within the EU or in its external relations. On 
the former, special arrangements were in place 
for East Germany throughout the Cold War; 
and the case of Greenland has already been 
noted. Various special arrangements are in 
place for the Åland islands, an autonomous 
region of Finland, for Akrotiri and Dhekelia, the 
two British Overseas Territories and ‘Sovereign 
Base Areas’ on Cyprus, and for others. Within 
the EU’s external relations, Kaliningrad enjoys 
special status in EU-Russia relations because 
of its geographical location. Liechtenstein has 
a number of ‘opt-outs’ within the EEA and 
‘special solution’ on free movement of workers. 
There are also special arrangements in place 
governing the position of northern Cyprus in 
the context of Turkey’s participation in the EU’s 
customs union. Were a bespoke arrangement 
reflecting Northern Ireland’s geographical 
location to be sought, precedent suggests that 
agreement could be reached.
Options 4: A Bespoke Arrangement
for Outside the EU
This all assumes a new UK-EU relationship is 
established. What options does the UK have, 
however, if no agreement is reached? A first 
point to make is that the UK would not be able 
to conclude bilateral trade agreements with 
individual EU member states, including the 
Republic of Ireland. The EU is a customs union 
and has a Common Commercial Policy; this 
means trade agreements have to be with the EU 
as a whole and the EU’s Common External Tariff 
would be applied to UK exports to the EU. The 
UK would be able to impose tariffs on imports 
from the EU. 
Such tariffs would have to comply with the 
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
These rules will apply to the UK on leaving the 
EU and they set limits on the maximum tariffs 
that can be applied to trade in goods. Over the 
last twenty years there has been a steady and 
phased reduction in tariffs and a move away 
from import restrictions such as quotas. The 
average tariff on industrial goods has dropped of 
6.3% to 3.8% with fewer products being charged 
high duty rates. The WTO also provides a forum 
for governments to negotiate trade agreements 
and settle trade disputes.
They UK would also be able to conclude trade 
agreements with other non-EU countries, 
provided the agreements conformed to WTO 
rules. 
Options 5: No Agreement
Options for Northern Ireland
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What are the issues 
Northern Ireland 
must consider?

Issues for 
Northern Ireland
The prospect of a UK withdrawal from the 
EU and efforts to negotiate a new UK-EU 
relationship raises many issues and challenges. 
For Northern Ireland, owing not least to its 
geographical location, its status within the 
devolution settlement, its economic structure 
and its recent history, there are particular 
issues for this part of the UK to be considered 
and addressed, a reality that is not always 
appreciated further afield, especially in 
Westminster and Whitehall. 
A key challenge for all concerned is to 
recognize the issues and think creatively 
about how they might be addressed in the 
light of the EU referendum outcome. In terms 
of developments and approach to Brexit 
discussions and negotiations attention should 
also be given to the terms of the Good Friday 
Agreement and its status as an internationally 
recognized treaty. What follows are a range of 
issues of particular concern. For each issue a 
number of questions about the implications 
of a UK withdrawal from the EU are raised. 
In some cases, a UK withdrawal from the EU 
could see the transfer of competence devolved 
to Northern Ireland which raises additional 
questions for consideration.
The lists of issues and questions are far from 
exhaustive.
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The EU is the world’s largest agricultural trader. 
The UK is a net-importer of agri-food products, 
importing almost twice as much from other EU 
member states than it exports to them. The EU 
market is important for the UK farming sector 
and accounted for some £13 billion worth of 
products in 2014. Agriculture is one of Northern 
Ireland’s most important industries in terms of 
both an annual turn-over of some £4.5 billion and 
a workforce of some 29,000 people. Northern 
Ireland is more dependent on the agricultural 
sector (including the agri-food business) than 
any other area of the UK. It shares much in 
common with agricultural in the Republic of 
Ireland. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
was established in 1962. The budget for EU 
agricultural spending in the period from 2014-20 
is an estimated €1 trillion. Some 40% of the EU’s 
entire budget is directed towards agriculture. It 
has been estimated that for every pound earned 
by Northern Irish farmers, some 87 pence comes 
from the EU’S Single Farm Payment. Challenges 
were already lying ahead for Northern Ireland 
farming sector as the CAP continued to undergo 
major reform, focusing much less on price support 
and seeking to agriculture competitive and to 
ensure better quality goods and lower prices for 
consumers. What are the issues for the farming 
community in Northern Ireland after Brexit? 
Agriculture
1. How does the UK withdraw from the CAP? 
2. What happens to an estimated 40,000 legal acts that are in force under 
the EU’s CAP? EU rules cover issues such as animal health, welfare and 
transportation of animals, hygiene, tagging of animals and disposal of 
carcasses.
3. What should a post-Brexit agricultural policy look like?
4. Should subsidies be maintained?
5. Will the Northern Ireland Executive assume responsibility for developing 
and administering a Northern Irish agriculture policy following Brexit? 
How will it manage these responsibilities?
6. What funding mechanisms would be put in place to replace the 
payments that currently come from the EU and specifically, the CAP? 
Will the level of support and funding arrangements be the same as in 
2015? 
7. Can arrangements be put in place to allow Northern Irish agricultural 
products to be exported to the EU tariff- and quota-free?
8. How much do employers in Northern Ireland within the agricultural and 
horticultural sectors rely on migrant and/or seasonal workers from the 
EU? How can the supply of such workers be maintained post-Brexit?
9. What would the impact be for the agricultural sector on the island of 
Ireland as a whole of having Northern Ireland outside the EU?
10. What will the impact be of any post-Brexit tariffs, quotas and customs 
controls on supply chains and their sustained economic viability?
11. What opportunities arise from a post Brexit Northern Ireland for 
consumers and farmers?
12. How might a move away from CAP subsidies affect the environment and 
countryside management schemes? 
13. What will the impact of Brexit be on agricultural and food prices and 
what will the impact be on the economy and family incomes?
14. How can the interests of Northern Ireland’s agricultural producers and 
processes best be identified and represented in negotiations on a new 
UK-EU relationship?
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The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was 
established in 1970. This policy was designed 
to manage the issue of a finite resource 
(fish) whose own ‘freedom of movement’ 
necessitated the imposition of national quotas 
to prevent overfishing. The conservation of fish 
stocks lies at the heart of the CFP. However, 
the introduction of quotas (Total Allowable 
Catches) as well as limitations to fleet capacity 
and the number of days that boats could be 
put to sea were not well received within the 
industry. Today, the CFP is more focused than 
ever on helping fishing communities across the 
EU; seeks to assist in the transition to sustainable 
fishing; supports coastal communities in 
diversifying their economies; and finances 
projects that create new jobs and improve 
quality of life along European coasts. To realise 
these aspirations the CFP provides finance 
through the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF) for the sector. The UK receives 
some €243 million in the period from 2014-
20. The fishing industry in Northern Ireland is 
largely centred around Portavogie, Kilkeel and 
Portaferry in County Down and employs some 
800 people. Fishing is a devolved responsibility 
and the Northern Ireland Executive and the 
Department of Agriculture, Environment and 
Rural Affairs have responsibility for ensuring 
that EU rules are followed and liaising with the 
other devolved UK regions in formulating a UK 
position ahead of meetings of the Council of 
the European Union.
Fisheries
1. Will a post-Brexit UK regain complete control over the greater part of the 
northern European fishing grounds (control of 200 nautical miles from 
British coasts)? 
2. Could the UK follow the examples of Norway, Iceland and the Faroes and 
be in a position to create its own fishing opportunities?
3. Would the current funding streams from the CFP and the EMFF be 
replicated from Whitehall or the Northern Ireland Executive at the same 
levels, in terms of research, policy development and subsidies? 
4. Will boats from ports in Northern Ireland be able to fish freely or will 
they face restrictions about their access to EU territorial waters and how 
much they can fish? 
5. How would the limits of EU and UK waters be determined?
6. How easy would it be to establish bilateral access and trade agreements 
with the EU and other partners (e.g. Norway)?
7. Would the UK remain a member of all key international fishing bodies? 
8. How would access to EU waters work? 
9. Would the UK have extensive market access to the EU or would new 
barriers to trade emerge if the UK only secured ‘most favoured nation’ 
status under WTO rules? 
10. How can the interests of Northern Ireland’s fishing and fish-processing 
industries best be identified and represented in negotiations on a new 
UK-EU relationship?
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Much environmental legislation in the UK – 200+ 
pieces – has originated from the EU. It covers 
areas such as waste management, air pollution, 
bathing and water standards, nature and 
biodiversity legislation, chemical safety, and air 
and noise pollution. Waste has been a particular 
issue for Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland 
Executive and the newly created Department for 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs will 
be responsible for developing an environmental 
policy for Northern Ireland post-Brexit. Decisions 
may have to be made on which EU directives 
on environmental policy should be retained 
and which might be removed from the statute 
books. There has been a substantial decrease in 
the amount of new EU environmental legislation 
being pursued over the last 15 years and 
especially since 2010. However, the issue of the 
existing environmental obligations has been a 
challenging one for Northern Ireland. 
Environmental policy 
1. Brexit should provide an opportunity for the UK to determine the scope 
and detail of environmental regulation that suits it. Will it be able to do 
this?
2. What should UK environmental policy outside the EU look like?
3. What principles should underpin a post-Brexit UK environmental policy?
4. How much scope will Northern Ireland have to deviate from a UK policy?
5. What should the priorities of environmental policy be in Northern 
Ireland? 
6. How might those priorities be funded?
7. What happens to existing EU environmental law (both directives and 
regulations) post-Brexit? Might they be annulled? If so, how and when? 
8. What happens in cases where EU laws implement UK obligations under 
international conventions – e.g. the Convention on International Trade in 
endangered species of wild fauna and flora? 
9. The European Commission currently co-ordinates much scientific and 
technical research which forms the basis for EU environmental policy. 
What provision will be made post-Brexit for research funding? Will the 
UK continue to participate in EU research programmes? 
10. How will the UK influence international environmental agreements? Will 
it have a stronger or less influential voice outside the EU? 
11. How might cross-border environmental issues on the island of Ireland be 
best addressed?
12. How can Northern Ireland’s environmental interests be most effectively 
identified and represented in negotiations on a new UK-EU relationship?
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Energy is fast becoming one of the most pressing 
issues for Europe given growing demand, the 
persistence of volatile prices and the possibility 
of disruptions to supply. The EU’s energy policy 
is constructed around three core aims that centre 
on the security of supply (especially in terms of 
gas and oil), the competiveness of the energy 
sector (e.g. electricity and gas suppliers) and 
finally, sustainability. Energy flows across national 
borders within the EU. The European Commission 
is pursuing its own plans (Europe 2020) for an 
‘energy union’ that seeks to secure affordable 
energy for EU citizens, places emphasis on the 
need for climate friendly energy, lower carbon 
emissions, combats global warming and aims to 
enable Europe to speak with a single voice on 
global energy matters. The idea of an Energy 
Union has previously been welcomed by the UK 
government. Outside the EU, the UK will need to 
pursue its own energy policy. What might that 
post-Brexit policy look like and how will it affect 
and address the needs of Northern Ireland?
Energy policy 
1. Could a post-Brexit UK repeal all existing EU regulations on energy (such 
as renewables targets), and if so, would this benefit or damage the UK?
2. Would a post-Brexit Northern Ireland still be able to access the EU’s 
energy market?
3. Would tariffs be imposed on energy imports? And to what extent would 
this lead to higher energy costs for both consumers and businesses in 
Northern Ireland?
4. How will Brexit impact on the supply of electricity from the Republic 
of Ireland and the idea of a single market for electricity on the island of 
Ireland?
5. How much would Brexit impact on the energy sector in the Republic of 
Ireland, particularly given the growing importance of gas and electricity 
connectors and the reality that much of the island of Ireland’s energy 
needs is imported?
6. Would Northern Ireland be excluded from potential sources of EU 
funding under the EU’s ambitious plans for renewables and plans to cut 
emissions? 
7. Would Brexit reduce restrictions on fracking as an alternative source of 
energy for Northern Ireland?
8. What will be the consequences of Brexit be for policy on the 
development of alternative and renewable sources of energy?
9. How can Northern Ireland’s energy needs be best secured following a UK 
withdrawal from the EU?
10. What processes should be used to ensure that Northern Ireland’s energy 
interests are most effectively identified and represented in negotiations 
on a new UK-EU relationship?
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Through UK membership of EU, Northern Ireland 
businesses currently have access to a single 
market of almost 500 million people. Free trade 
means that goods can be traded free of quotas 
and tariffs. The existence of a near complete 
‘single market’ means that, in principle, services 
and capital also move freely within the EU. 
According to the Office for National Statistics 
44.6% of UK exports of goods and services go 
to the EU. The figure for exports from Northern 
Ireland in 2013 was 56% according to HM Revenue 
and Customs.5 The EU is therefore Northern 
Ireland’s main international export market. Within 
these figures, the Republic of Ireland accounts 
for 37% of total exports meaning the rest of 
the EU accounts for only 21% of overall exports 
from Northern Ireland. In 2012, according to 
government calculations, manufactured goods 
made up 50% of total exports to the EU with an 
almost even split between the Republic of Ireland 
and the rest of the EU.6 For services the figures 
were 39% and 8% respectively; for food and drink 
they were 91% and 35%. As a source of imports, 
the EU is Northern Ireland’s largest partner, 
accounting for 55% of imports in 2013.7  
The Republic of Ireland (28%) was again the 
largest source, followed by Germany (6%) and the 
Netherlands (5%). China accounted for 17% and 
the US for 7% of imports. China did not, however, 
feature in the top five destinations for exports from 
Northern Ireland. The US (10%) and Canada (6%) 
were ahead of France (5%) and Germany (4%).
As a customs union the EU negotiates trade deals 
with non-member states on behalf of its member 
states. Most countries have some form of trade 
agreement with the EU with many providing for 
either preferential market access or reciprocal free 
trade. Increasingly arrangements extend beyond 
free trade in industrial goods to include services. 
The EU currently has free trade agreements with 
most European countries and with most countries 
in the Mediterranean. Trade agreements have 
also been agreed with South Korea, Canada and 
countries in Central and South America. A post-
Brexit UK is unlikely to remain subject to these 
agreements or any other trade agreements 
the EU may conclude in the future (e.g. the 
proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the United States).
Trade and investment 
1. Post-Brexit how would trade between the UK and the EU be regulated? 
2. Would free trade continue?
3. Would tariffs and quotas be reintroduced?
4. Would the principles of the free movement of goods, services and capital 
be maintained in trade relations between the UK and the EU? 
5. Would any changes to existing free trade arrangements affect all trade or 
only certain sectors?
6. How might different sectors be affected?
7. How might any uncertainty surrounding the future of the trade regime 
between the UK and the EU affect business, consumer and investor 
confidence in the Northern Ireland economy?
8. How far might trade agreements with alternative trade regimes (e.g. 
European Free Trade Association, North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement) 
provide significant opportunities for growth in trade for Northern 
Ireland?
9. How can opportunities for expanding trade with non-members of the EU 
be maximised?
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/286202/RTS_Q4.pdf
6 https://www.detini.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/deti/measuring-ni-exports-report.pdf
7 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/286202/RTS_Q4.pdf
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10. How will UK access to foreign markets be affected by leaving the EU? 
11. How quickly can replacement deals be negotiated?
12. Will the UK be able to secure the same level of trade access to foreign 
markets as it currently has as an EU member state?
13. Does the UK government have sufficient administrative capacity to 
negotiate and manage replacement trade deals with all partners?
14. Will trading partners be willing to conclude bilateral deals with the UK?
15. How long will it take to conclude bilateral trade agreements to replace 
current arrangements? 
16. With which trading partners would free trade most benefit Northern 
Ireland?
17. With which trading partners would free trade prove most challenging 
economically for Northern Ireland?
18. How does Northern Ireland ensure its interests are effectively 
represented in UK trade negotiations with the EU and with non-EU 
partners?
Issues for Northern Ireland
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The Irish border is the only land border that the 
UK shares with another state. Since the launch 
of the single market in 1992 and the onset of 
the Irish Peace Process in 1994 the Irish border 
has been reconfigured as an open, soft border. 
Consequently, Irish border customs posts, 
British Army watchtowers, and Security Force 
installations and checkpoints were surplus 
to requirements. Secondary cross-border 
roads which were cratered or blocked with 
bollards during the Troubles were refurbished 
and re-opened. The result is that the physical 
manifestation of the Irish border itself is hardly 
discernible and there is freedom of movement 
across it.
The free movement of people is a central plank 
of the EU’s single market. It allows EU citizens 
to travel, live and work in any EU member state. 
The scale of free movement has increased 
substantially since the 2004 enlargement 
which admitted ten new member states into 
the EU. This resulted in large numbers of EU 
migrants seeking to live and work in more 
economically prosperous member states such 
as the UK.8 The net economic benefit of free 
movement for the UK has been largely positive, 
but the political impact has been concerning. 
Discontent with the numbers entering the UK 
and their impact on the lives and livelihoods of 
UK citizens has seen a growth in support for 
political parties opposed to immigration and 
was a key factor behind the ‘leave’ vote in the 
EU referendum. This opposition targets not just 
EU migrants, but also non-EU citizens seeking 
asylum. Leaving the EU, provided the UK opts 
out of the free movement of people, would 
allow restrictions and limits to be imposed on 
the inward migration of EU citizens to the UK. 
To do this effective immigration controls will be 
needed.
Net inward migration to Northern Ireland has 
increased since the early 2000s after a long 
period of net outward migration. Despite this 
reversal, Northern Ireland still has the UK’s 
lowest immigration rate. The arrival of migrants 
(EU and non-EU) however, has not been 
comprehensively managed. Key strategies, 
including for a Racial Equality Strategy and 
a Refugee Integration Strategy, for example, 
have not been introduced. A number of political 
parties have campaigned against immigration 
or at least for tighter immigration controls. 
One obstacle to achieving tighter controls is 
the absence of a border. Pursuing immigration 
controls at the Irish border is compounded by 
the existence of and support for the Common 
Travel Area (CTA) which effectively allows for 
unhindered movement of UK and Irish citizens 
on the island of Ireland and between the 
Republic of Ireland and the UK. If a post-Brexit 
UK opts out of the free movement of people 
then the Irish border becomes the external 
border of the EU. This poses serious questions 
for the sustainability of the CTA with all the 
economic, political and social consequences 
that may entail.
The border, the free movement of people, 
immigration and Common Travel Area
8 Like the Republic of Ireland (and Sweden), the UK government decided not to impose transitional controls of up to 
seven years on free movement from new EU member states. 
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1. Will a post-Brexit UK develop a ‘tougher’ immigration policy and what 
would the model look like – e.g. Australian points system, ‘blue cards’?
2. What would be the effect of this new immigration policy on EU nationals 
seeking to come to the UK? 
3. What role can Northern Ireland play in shaping this policy? 
4. Will a new UK immigration policy require the imposition of restrictions 
on the movement of people between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland? 
5. Will the effective implementation of such restrictions necessitate border 
controls?
6. How might the CTA be affected by such restriction and controls?
7. Can a ‘special status’ be agreed for the border and by whom?
8. What will be the impact of restrictions on cross-border workers on the 
island of Ireland? 
9. What will the effect of restrictions be on local employment and 
economic activity in border areas?
10. Can the continuation of the CTA be reconciled with the UK abandoning 
the free movement of workers and persons in its new relationship with 
the EU?
11. Will the EU place restrictions on non-EU citizens from Northern Ireland 
wishing to live and work in other EU member states? 
12. Should Northern Ireland press for EU workers currently resident in 
Northern Ireland to have their current rights recognized and upheld in 
the event of Brexit?
13. What does a new more restrictive immigration policy mean for 
employers, particularly those reliant on seasonal migrant labour?
14. How does Northern Ireland ensure issues relating to the border and to 
the CTA are effectively represented in the withdrawal negotiations and 
the negotiations on a new UK-EU relationship?
15. How does Northern Ireland ensure its interests are effectively 
represented and reflected in the development of UK immigration policy 
post-Brexit?
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If the UK through Brexit opts out of the EU’s 
customs union, the EU’s external tariff will be 
applied to Northern Irish goods entering the 
Republic of Ireland. The UK will presumably 
apply tariffs and potentially quotas to EU goods 
entering Northern Ireland. Separate regimes 
can be expected for industrial and processed 
goods as well as agricultural produce. The 
administrative capacity to collect tariffs and 
impose customs controls on goods crossing 
the Irish border will be required. The capacity 
to ensure rules of origin on goods originating 
in part or wholly from another non-EU member 
states are upheld will also be needed. 
The border and free movement of goods 
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1. To what extent can tariffs be gathered and quotas be enforced without 
physical border controls?
2. How might physical border controls – if needed – be organized and 
where?
3. How costly will new customs requirements be for importers and 
exporters?
4. How much will new customs controls cost to administer? Who will bear 
the cost?
5. At what level should the UK set tariffs and quotas – if at all – on goods 
imported from the EU?
6. Might, indeed should, Brexit see the introduction of export tariffs and 
quotas?
7. Can a special status for Northern Ireland be established whereby 
customs controls are not imposed on cross-border trade?
8. Can special rules of origin be established for trade between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, e.g. where trade in agriculture and 
the food-processing industry are concerned?
9. Could Northern Ireland remain part of the EU’s customs union even if the 
UK opted out of it?
10. How can Northern Ireland’s trading interests be most effectively 
identified and represented in negotiations on a new UK-EU relationship?
11. How might these interests be most effectively identified and represented 
in negotiations on new trade arrangements with non-EU member states? 
Issues for Northern Ireland
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Cross-border cooperation was embedded 
through the creation of a cross-border, North-
South institutional infrastructure under the 
terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It 
consists of the North South Ministerial Council 
and its Implementation Bodies. EU funding, 
principally through the INTERREG and Peace 
programmes, has been essential for the creation 
of living cross-border, North South institutions, 
as well as cross-border hard and soft capital 
projects. Many of the soft capital projects 
have a peacebuilding objective. Respected 
evaluations of such projects have found that 
they have made a significant contribution to 
peacebuilding in the Irish border region over 
the past two decades.
Through its Peace programmes the EU has 
provided sustained support for peacebuilding 
in Northern Ireland and the border counties of 
the Republic of Ireland, much of it at the local 
community level. Peace I (1995-1999), Peace II 
(2000-2006), Peace III (2007-13) and Peace 
IV (2014-2020) represent a sophisticated and 
sustained example of ‘peace-building from 
below’ to complement rapprochement at 
the political elite level. Many funded projects 
have promoted cross-community and cross-
border dialogue with the peacebuilding goal 
of accepting differences and recognising 
commonality. Evaluations of Peace programme 
projects have detailed many positive 
experiences, for example, through engagement 
in discussions on British/Irish histories, 
participation in storytelling for children, and 
in the organisation of cross-community, cross-
border sporting and musical events. A cross-
border dimension was appreciated by many 
project leaders from Protestant, unionist or 
loyalist backgrounds because it provided the 
opportunity to engage with those perceived 
to be from a ‘less threatening’ Irish nationalist 
background. Such engagement is a potentially 
important precursor to improved cross-
community relations in Northern Ireland. For 
others, the cross-border dimension provided 
a welcome opportunity to participate in a 
society unmarked by territorial segregation 
and disputes. What happens with Brexit?
Peace funding and cross-border 
cooperation 
1. Could cross-border cooperation continue in the event of the UK leaving 
the EU?
2. If so, what would be the obstacles to overcome?
3. What would be the implications of Brexit for cross-border institutions?
4. How would EU funding for cross-border cooperation be affected?
5. What would be the implications for peacebuilding?
6. Will EU cross-border funding (INTERREG) be replaced by national/
regional authorities? 
7. What will happen to the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB)? 
8. How will other cross-border bodies be affected? 
9. Will EU Peace funding for Northern Ireland stop if the UK leaves the EU?
10. Is peace funding still needed?
11. How can Northern Ireland’s interests regarding peace funding and cross-
border cooperation be most effectively identified and then promoted?
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The EU structural funds comprise the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and 
the European Social Fund (ESF). In Northern 
Ireland, the ERDF focuses on improving 
sustainable economic growth and is designed 
to promote research and innovation, encourage 
SME competitiveness and support the shift to 
a low-carbon economy. The ESF is concerned 
with promoting social inclusion and combatting 
unemployment as well as investing in education, 
skills and life-long learning. Its core focus 
remains to boost employment opportunities 
and encourage labour mobility. Northern Ireland 
may no longer be identified as an Objective 
1 area but as a ‘transitional’ area still receives 
financial support under the funds. In the financial 
period from 2014-20 some €460 million is being 
directed towards Northern Ireland (including 
an additional €181 million from the British 
government). 
Structural funding
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1. Post-Brexit the UK would lose any entitlement to financing from the 
structural funds. How will this impact Northern Ireland?
2. How much of an issue would the loss of access to structural funds be for 
businesses and people in Northern Ireland?
3. Would there be replacement funds financed by the UK government?
4. Is such funding necessary?
5. What would Northern Ireland’s priorities be in an environment of reduced 
structural funding?
6. Could Northern Ireland retain some form of access to the ERDF and the 
ESF after a Brexit?
7. Would involvement in cross-border programmes (e.g. INTERREG IVC 
which provides funding for interregional cooperation across Europe 
under the ERDF) be able to continue?
Issues for Northern Ireland
Issues for Northern Ireland
eudebateni.org | 43
1. If a post-Brexit UK is not part of the single market, will EU students continue 
to take up places at Northern Ireland’s universities, especially if they are 
charged higher, international fees?
2. Will a post-Brexit UK retain access to the EU’s research funding 
programmes? And on what terms?
3. Will the UK government be willing to make financial contributions to the EU 
budget to sustain such access long-term?
4. To what extent will existing teaching and research collaborations with 
university partners in EU member states be sustained post-Brexit?
5. What would be the impact on industrial, commercial and academic research 
activities and capacity in Northern Ireland if the UK is no longer involved in 
EU research programmes?
6. Should the UK government seek to retain access to the EU’s Erasmus 
programme for student mobility?
7. How might this be funded?
8. What would be the impact of leaving the EU on the protection of 
intellectual property rights?
9. How can Northern Ireland’s interests regarding research and development 
and higher education cooperation be most effectively identified and then 
promoted in negotiations on a new UK-EU relationship?
EU Higher Education activity essentially has 
two dimensions: student mobility and research 
funding. Successive Erasmus programmes have 
provided funding for student exchanges. This 
has increased opportunities for students at UK 
universities to study as part of their degrees at 
universities in other EU member states. These 
exchanges have also increased the diversity 
of students studying at UK universities. Free 
movement and non-discrimination principles 
also mean that EU students have access to 
higher education in Northern Ireland on the 
same terms as domestic students. In terms of 
research, successive ‘framework’ programmes, 
most recently the Horizon 2020 programme, 
have provided opportunities for UK universities 
to access EU funds to support collaborative 
research with other universities and industry in 
the EU. Increasingly opportunities have existed 
to draw on EU funds for collaborations with 
partners outside the EU. The EU also promotes 
the protection of knowledge through the 
adoption of legislation on intellectual property 
and patents.
Research and development / higher
education
1. What material impact will the loss of EU citizenship have for UK citizens in 
Northern Ireland?
2. How will Brexit affect EU citizens resident in Northern Ireland? Should their 
current rights be extended?
3. What will be the impact of Brexit on UK citizens from Northern Ireland living 
and working in the EU? Will their rights be extended?
4. What will be the impact of Brexit on Irish passport-holders resident or 
working in Northern Ireland? 
5. What restrictions will Brexit entail on the right of citizens in Northern Ireland 
to work or study in the Republic of Ireland or another EU member state? 
6. How might restrictions on working and residence impact on relations 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland? 
7. Will the Common Travel Area (CTA) between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland be maintained? 
8. Will other EU member states remove the facility for UK citizens from 
Northern Ireland to avail of diplomatic and consular assistance from other 
EU member states while overseas? 
9. Will Brexit and the loss of EU citizenship see anti-discrimination safeguards 
being lost? How will this impact on the equality agenda in Northern Ireland? 
Every person holding the nationality of an 
EU member state is a citizen of the EU. EU 
citizenship is additional to national citizenship – it 
does not replace it. All EU citizens enjoy a series 
of important rights. Many of these are related to 
the functioning of the single market and include 
the right to travel freely around the EU, and the 
right to reside, study and/or work in another 
EU member state. The right to reside in another 
EU member state for more than three months 
requires citizens to meet certain conditions 
depending on their status as workers, students, 
etc. EU citizens also enjoy political rights and 
protections. Citizens are entitled to vote for and 
stand as a candidate in European Parliament and 
municipal elections. They can avail of diplomatic 
and consular assistance from the authorities of 
any EU member state when overseas. Citizens 
may also petition the European Parliament and 
complain to the European Ombudsman. They 
have a right of access to official EU documents 
and may write to any EU institution or body 
in any Treaty language. The EU also prohibits 
discrimination, including on the grounds of 
nationality and so EU citizens enjoy the right 
to equal treatment. If the UK leaves the EU, it is 
expected that UK citizens will lose EU citizenship 
rights.
Citizens’ rights
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The range of sources and commentary on 
‘Brexit’ increases daily. The Briefing Paper 
already includes embedded links to a range of 
publications. Analyses and reports among these 
are listed below alongside other publications that 
either have informed the content of this briefing 
paper or offer other insights into the question of 
‘what next’ as everybody comes to terms with the 
consequences of the result of the EU referendum 
result on 23 June 2016
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